Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many analysts expected the countries of Central Asia to significantly reduce their dependence on Moscow. The reality, however, has proved more complex: regional states continue to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy, balancing the preservation of ties with Russia with expanding cooperation with the West, China and other partners. In this context, the figure of the Kazakh businessman Shakhmurat Mutalip has emerged as a telling indicator of how Russian influence is adapting to new geopolitical conditions.
Shakhmurat Mutalip, born in 1990 in the village of KazTSIK (now Askara Tokpanova) in the Almaty region, began his career as a mechanic in 2008. Today he is among the most widely discussed businessmen in Kazakhstan, with his name appearing in Bloomberg, the Financial Times and other leading media outlets. Mutalip heads Integra Construction KZ, the largest contractor involved in railway repair and construction in Kazakhstan, controlling a significant share of infrastructure projects, including the Middle Corridor (the China–Europe transit route via the Caspian Sea). He also serves as president of the Kazakhstan Boxing Federation, strengthening his standing within international sporting and elite circles.
According to media reports, Mutalip’s key advantage is the strong backing he enjoys from the Tokayev family and the head of the presidential administration.
He has long maintained close relations with the president’s nephews — the so-called “three musketeers”, the children of Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s sister. These ties are described not as formal contacts but as relationships of genuine trust. “The ‘musketeers’ regard him as one of their own — reliable and tested. It is precisely this support that makes his position within the system almost untouchable,” says the expert Aidar Zhusupov.
The businessman publicly meets with Kazakhstan’s president and is known for taking a firm line in negotiations with international companies. According to sources, acting “on behalf of the family and with a sword in hand”, he has even threatened to push major international players such as Glencore and Trafigura out of the country.
In 2025–2026 Mutalip’s interests expanded sharply into the mining sector — a key pillar of Kazakhstan’s strategic resources. Negotiations are under way to acquire a 70% stake in Kazzinc (a producer of zinc and gold) from Glencore for $4–4.5bn, as well as up to 40% of Eurasian Resources Group (ERG, about $1.4bn) — one of the largest global players in ferrochrome, cobalt and other metals. Such deals could significantly reshape Kazakhstan’s mining sector by placing control of critical assets in the hands of domestic figures with close ties to Russia.
Mutalip maintains extensive contacts with Russian elites: personal links with Andrey Kostin (president of VTB), acquaintances through Alisher Usmanov, and cooperation between Integra and Sinara – Transport Machines despite sanctions. ERG carries substantial debt to VTB and Sberbank, while special licences issued by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) allow payments to continue, helping avoid default and the potential transfer of assets under Moscow’s direct control. Ukrainian and Western analysts interpret this as a mechanism for preserving Russian influence over resources and infrastructure through trusted local proxies.
This development fits into Russia’s broader “pivot to the South” — a strategic reorientation following 2022. The war in Ukraine and Western sanctions accelerated the loss of European markets, forcing Moscow to search for new channels for exporting energy, technology and capital. Central Asia has become a key hub: re-exports of dual-use goods are rising, financial operations are conducted through the Eurasian Economic Union, and joint infrastructure projects are expanding. Russia is increasing supplies of gas and oil to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan — by 20–22% in 2025, investing in nuclear power projects in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, in hydroelectric plants, and using the region to preserve technological supply chains.
The pivot southwards is not merely economic adaptation but part of Vladimir Putin’s broader revanchist strategy aimed at strengthening the concept of “Greater Eurasia”. Central Asia acts simultaneously as a buffer, a transit corridor and a source of resources. This is reflected in growing energy dependence — with gas, oil and electricity supplied at prices far below global levels, in control over transit routes (pipelines, railways and the reversal of Soviet-era lines), and in political influence exerted through elites and personal networks, as illustrated by the case of Mutalip.
Despite Uzbekistan and Tajikistan adopting a tougher stance towards Russian influence, Kazakhstan remains the most open. Trade with Russia continues to reach record levels, with turnover of $23–28bn in 2024–2025. Infrastructure links are deepening, while proxy figures such as Mutalip are helping to edge out Western investors, including Glencore and Trafigura. Against the backdrop of the constitutional referendumscheduled for 15 March 2026 — which proposes introducing the post of vice-president, establishing a unicameral Kurultai parliament and other reforms, such mechanisms allow Moscow to pursue a form of soft expansion without open confrontation.
Ultimately, Central Asia is evolving from what was once seen as Russia’s “backyard” into a key pillar of its strategy for surviving under sanctions. This is not merely about circumventing restrictions, but also about attempting to secure a long-term geopolitical presence in the South. Kazakhstan emphasises its multi-vector foreign policy and adherence to sanctions, yet the broader dynamics suggest that Russian influence is adapting and expanding through economic networks, elites and infrastructure.
